Should the Lower Earner Claim Social Security Early and the Higher Earner Delay? A Household Monte Carlo (2026)

Should the lower earner claim Social Security early and the higher earner delay?

Key numbers

10,000 quasi-Monte Carlo paths per arm, identical market draws in every arm; JPMorgan LTCMA 2026 capital-market assumptions (as of 2025-11-01); all dollars in today’s dollars; benefits receive a full cost-of-living adjustment; no tax applied. “Success” means the portfolio never reached $0 before 95.

Run this couple’s plan in the free planner →

Opens the Monte Carlo planner prefilled with this study’s plan — both 62, plan to 95, $1,000,000, $60,000 a year, 60/40, the lower earner’s $12,600 a year from 62. Enter the higher earner’s benefit and claiming age under the spouse inputs to complete the household; the claiming-age comparison in the planner’s report restates any benefit to 62, 67 and 70 with the same factors used here.

What is being compared

Each spouse’s Social Security is described by a primary insurance amount (PIA), the monthly benefit at full retirement age 67. Claiming earlier reduces it and claiming later increases it by the SSA’s set factors, which the site’s planner applies in its claiming-age comparison and which this study takes from the same code: 70% of PIA at 62, 100% at 67, 124% at 70. The engine is given each earner’s benefit at the chosen claiming age and pays it from that age in today’s dollars, raised with inflation, so a full cost-of-living adjustment is assumed. The household spends $60,000 a year from 62; whatever the benefits do not cover comes out of the $1,000,000 portfolio, and whatever they exceed goes back into it.

Two personas are run. Persona A has PIAs of $3,000 / $1,500: two substantial earners. Persona B has PIAs of $2,500 / $800: the case in which a spousal benefit would ordinarily lift the lower earner’s cheque. The engine has no spousal top-up, so persona B is run as a plain two-earner household and its lower earner receives only that earner’s own benefit; the page says so wherever persona B appears. Each spouse claims at 62, 67 or 70, nine combinations per persona, and every combination is paired against the same persona’s both-at-67 cell on identical market paths. The three cells in which both claim at the same age are shaded in the tables.

The survivor sensitivity runs the same nine combinations with the higher earner dying at 80, using the engine’s deterministic death age. From that month the household keeps the larger of the two benefits — the engine’s survivor rule — and spending is left at the full $60,000, so the survivor runs isolate what the claiming decision does to the survivor’s income and the household’s wealth, not what a smaller household would spend.

Benefit schedule (persona A, PIAs $3,000 / $1,500)

Today’s dollars; the engine raises every benefit with 2.5% inflation and deflates every reported balance back to 62. Persona B: higher earner $1,750 at 62, $2,500 at 67, $3,100 at 70; lower earner $560 at 62, $800 at 67, $992 at 70.

Cumulative household benefit by age, persona A

Deterministic sums of the monthly schedule in today’s dollars. In the last column the household keeps the larger of the two benefits from age 80. Shaded rows: both claim at the same age.

Results: persona A (PIAs $3,000 / $1,500)

Each row is one claiming combination against the both-at-67 baseline of the same persona. Dollar columns are wealth at 95 in today’s dollars; the paired columns are taken path by path.

“Paired median Δ” is the median over 10,000 paths of (this cell’s wealth − the both-at-67 cell’s wealth) at 95; “Ends higher” is the share of those paths with a positive difference. Shaded rows: both claim at the same age.

Results: persona B (PIAs $2,500 / $800, no spousal top-up)

Same construction. The lower earner’s $800 PIA is the case in which a spousal benefit would ordinarily apply; the engine does not model one, so this is a plain two-earner household.

Survivor sensitivity: the higher earner dies at 80

The same eighteen cells with the higher earner dying at 80, spending unchanged at $60,000. Paths are identical to the no-death runs through age 80 (asserted before publication), so the last column — each survivor cell against the same cell without the death — is exactly what the death costs the household at 95 on the same market path. The paired columns before it compare, as above, against both at 67 under the same death assumption.

Persona A

Persona B

Survivor’s benefit = the larger of the two benefits in payment at the death (the engine’s rule). The final column is the median over 10,000 paths of (wealth at 95 with the death − wealth at 95 without it); it cannot be positive because the smaller benefit stops and spending does not change.

The gap over time (persona A)

The engine reports each path’s wealth year by year, so the paired difference against both at 67 can be followed through retirement. The split (lower at 62, higher at 70) stands at +$69,027 at 67, when the lower earner’s early benefit has been arriving for five years while both-at-67 drew the full $60,000 from the portfolio; at −$53,457 at 70, after three years in which the higher earner drew nothing while both-at-67 received $3,000 a month; and at −$36,319 at 80 and +$3,109 at 95 as the $3,720-a-month benefit runs. No death is modelled in this table.

Median of the per-path difference at each age, with the share of paths on which the cell is ahead of both at 67. Shaded rows: both claim at the same age. Cells that share a timing pattern share their share-of-paths figure — 12.4% for every cell that only moves a claim from 67 to 62, 80.5% for every cell that only moves one from 67 to 70 — because on a path that never reaches $0 wealth at 95 is linear in the cash flows, so scaling a benefit scales the per-path difference without changing its sign; the split combines the two patterns and its sign depends on the path.

What the numbers say

The split against claiming together

For persona A the split (lower at 62, higher at 70) ended $3,109 more at 95 than both at 67 at the median and higher on 52.7% of paths, while its lifetime benefit to 95 was $1,531,800 against $1,512,000 (+$19,800). The two halves of the split pull in opposite directions: the lower earner’s early claim brings $1,050 a month from 62 that the baseline does not have until 67, at the price of $450 a month less for life; the higher earner’s delay gives up $3,000 a month between 67 and 70 for $720 a month more from 70 on. The reverse split (lower at 70, higher at 62) ended $106,431 less than both at 67 at the median, higher on 12.0% of paths, with lifetime benefits of $1,389,600. Averaged over the three cells in which the higher earner delays to 70 the paired median was +$59,286; over the three in which the higher earner claims at 62 it was −$152,167; over the three in which the lower earner claims at 62, −$92,313; in which the lower earner delays to 70, +$11,123.

The same-age cells

Both at 62 ended $210,027 less than both at 67 at the median (higher on 12.4% of paths, lifetime benefits $1,247,400); both at 70 ended $104,850 more (higher on 80.5%, lifetime benefits $1,674,000). Of the nine combinations for persona A the best at the median was lower at 70, higher at 70 (+$104,850), the worst lower at 62, higher at 62 (−$210,027); the highest 10th-percentile wealth at 95 came from lower at 70, higher at 70 ($1,100,051); the largest lifetime benefit to 95 from lower at 70, higher at 70 ($1,674,000) and the smallest from lower at 62, higher at 62 ($1,247,400). For persona B the best cell at the median was lower at 70, higher at 70 (+$76,388) and the worst lower at 62, higher at 62 (−$147,577).

What the survivor keeps

When the higher earner dies at 80 the household’s income drops to the larger of the two benefits, which is the higher earner’s: $2,100 a month if it was claimed at 62, $3,000 at 67, $3,720 at 70. Two things therefore change at once. The survivor’s income is set by the higher earner’s claiming age, and the benefit that stops is the lower earner’s — $1,050 a month if claimed at 62, $1,500 at 67, $1,860 at 70. Against its own no-death twin the death cost the split $252,584 at the median and the baseline $360,834; averaged over the higher earner’s three choices the cost was $252,405 where the lower earner had claimed at 62, $360,689 at 67 and $447,252 at 70. Against both at 67 the split moves from +$3,109 without the death to +$106,569 with it (higher in 95.4% of paths); both at 62 from −$210,027 to −$106,478; both at 70 from +$104,850 to +$21,689. Under the death assumption the best persona A cell at the median is lower at 62, higher at 70 (+$106,569 vs both at 67) and for persona B lower at 62, higher at 70 (+$74,841).

Success rates

For persona A success to 95 stays between 99.9% and 100.0% without the death and between 98.6% and 100.0% with it — $60,000 of spending against benefits of this size rarely exhausts the portfolio, so the claiming decision shows up in wealth at 95; for persona B, with smaller benefits, success runs from 94.8% to 99.9% (91.3% to 98.4% with the death) and moves with the claiming ages as well. The lowest success in any of the 36 cells was 91.3% and the highest 100.0%; for persona A the paired columns and the 10th-percentile wealth carry the result, and a household with less saved, higher spending or smaller benefits would see the same claiming mechanics acting on the failure rate, as persona B begins to. The site’s single-person claiming study shows the case in which the failure rate is the whole story.

What it means

• The two halves of the split are separate decisions. Averaged over the lower earner’s three choices, the higher earner delaying to 70 came out at +$59,286 against both at 67 and claiming at 62 at −$152,167; the lower earner claiming at 62 came out at −$92,313 and delaying to 70 at +$11,123.
• The survivor case is the higher earner’s claiming age. After the death the household lives on the higher earner’s benefit alone, at whatever factor it was claimed. With the death modelled, the cells in which the higher earner delays to 70 average +$66,041 against both at 67 and those in which the higher earner claims at 62 average −$144,288.
• Lifetime benefits and wealth at 95 rank the nine cells in the same order here. The order runs from lower at 70, higher at 70 ($1,674,000 of benefits, +$104,850 at the median) down to lower at 62, higher at 62 ($1,247,400, −$210,027), but the two scales differ: money that arrives early is invested on the same paths as everything else, and the plan’s return assumptions decide how much of a lifetime-benefit gap survives to 95.
• The band is wide. The split’s per-path difference against both at 67 ran from −$78,258 at its 10th percentile to +$50,719 at its 90th: the market path a couple actually gets matters more to the size of the difference than the median does.
• Spousal benefits are not in these numbers. Where the lower earner’s own benefit is small (persona B) the actual rules would ordinarily pay more than the engine models, and that changes the lower earner’s side of the decision.
• Not advice. Health, work, other income, taxes on benefits and the survivor rules’ details all sit outside this model; the page reports what the engine did for one plan.

CC-BY-4.0 — free for any use including republication and journalism, with attribution to QuantCalc Research.

Methodology

Assumptions and limitations

• Own benefits only. The engine models each earner’s own benefit and, after a death, the larger of the two. It has no spousal top-up, so a lower earner whose own benefit is small (persona B) is paid less here than the actual rules would pay.
• The survivor rule is “keep the larger benefit”. The SSA’s survivor computation has further rules (among them how the deceased’s early claim and the survivor’s own age at the death affect the amount) that are not modelled.
• One deterministic death age, spending unchanged. The higher earner dies at exactly 80 and the survivor keeps spending $60,000; no mortality table, no death of the lower earner, no change in spending. The site’s widow’s-penalty study covers the tax side of survivorship.
• Real dollars, full COLA. Benefits and spending rise with the plan’s 2.5% inflation and every balance is deflated to age 62; the engine’s cost-of-living adjustment equals its inflation assumption.
• No tax on benefits or withdrawals. This mode of the engine adds benefits gross and draws withdrawals gross. The taxation of benefits, the tax torpedo and the effect of claiming on a survivor’s filing status are outside these numbers.
• No earnings test, no scheduled benefit reduction. Neither spouse works after 62, and benefits are paid as scheduled; the site’s 2033-reduction study covers the trust-fund case.
• Full retirement age 67. Both spouses are treated as born in 1960 or later; an older cohort has a lower FRA and slightly different factors.
• Constant real spending and parametric returns. Both earners’ household spends the same constant-real amount every month; returns are lognormal with the stated means, volatilities and correlations, without regime switching, fat tails or historical resampling.
• One plan. $1,000,000, $60,000 a year and 60/40 leave the portfolio rarely exhausted, so the study speaks through wealth at 95; other plans would show the same mechanics through the success rate.
• Not advice. Educational research on the mechanics of a two-earner claiming decision; not financial, tax or legal advice.

Frequently asked questions

Should the lower earner claim Social Security early and the higher earner delay?

For the couple modelled here, both 62 with $1,000,000 on 60/40, spending $60,000 a year to 95, with benefits at full retirement age of $3,000 / $1,500 a month: claiming the lower benefit at 62 and the higher at 70 ended $3,109 more at 95 than claiming both at 67 on the same 10,000 market paths (median of the per-path difference), finishing higher in 52.7% of paths, with lifetime household benefits of $1,531,800 against $1,512,000. When the higher earner dies at 80 the survivor keeps $3,720 a month instead of $3,000, and the paired median difference against both-at-67 becomes +$106,569. The reverse split (lower delays to 70, higher claims at 62) ended $106,431 less than both at 67. These are mechanics for one plan, not a recommendation.

What does delaying the higher earner do for the survivor?

In the engine the household keeps the larger of the two benefits after a death, so the survivor's income is whatever the higher earner's benefit was: $2,100 a month if claimed at 62, $3,000 at 67, $3,720 at 70 for a $3,000 PIA. With the higher earner dying at 80 and spending unchanged, wealth at 95 fell against the same cell without the death by $252,050 at the median for lower at 62, higher at 62 and by $447,434 for lower at 70, higher at 70. The loss is the lower earner's benefit that stops, so it follows the lower earner's claiming age: averaged over the higher earner's three choices it was $252,405 where the lower earner had claimed at 62, $360,689 at 67 and $447,252 at 70.

Is claiming both at 62, or both at 70, better than splitting?

Against both at 67, both at 62 ended $210,027 less at the median (higher on 12.4% of paths; lifetime benefits $1,247,400) and both at 70 ended $104,850 more (higher on 80.5%; lifetime benefits $1,674,000), while the split, lower at 62 and higher at 70, ended $3,109 more (higher on 52.7%). Across the nine combinations for this persona the paired median ran from -$210,027 (lower at 62, higher at 62) to +$104,850 (lower at 70, higher at 70). Averaged over the three cells in which the higher earner delays to 70 the paired median was +$59,286; over the three in which the higher earner claims at 62 it was -$152,167.

Why are the success rates so close together for persona A?

Because $60,000 a year of spending against a $1,000,000 portfolio and household benefits of $54,000 a year from 67 (persona A, both at 67) leaves little to draw from the portfolio once both benefits are in payment. For persona A success to 95 ran from 99.9% to 100.0% without the death and from 98.6% to 100.0% with it, so the claiming decision is visible in wealth at 95 rather than in survival. Persona B, with benefits of $39,600 a year at 67, ran from 94.8% to 99.9% (91.3% to 98.4% with the death): a plan with a smaller portfolio, higher spending or smaller benefits shows the same claiming mechanics acting on the success rate.

Does the model include spousal benefits?

No. The engine models each earner's own benefit and, after a death, the larger of the two; it has no spousal top-up. Persona B ($2,500 / $800) is included because a lower earner with an $800 PIA is the case in which a spousal benefit would ordinarily apply; here it is run as a plain two-earner household, so the lower earner's income in persona B is that earner's own benefit only. For persona B the split (lower at 62, higher at 70) ended $22,264 more than both at 67 at the median, higher on 68.3% of paths, and $74,841 more once the higher earner's death at 80 is modelled.

Are these numbers real dollars, and are taxes included?

All dollar figures are in today's dollars: benefits and spending are raised with 2.5% inflation (a full cost-of-living adjustment on the benefits) and every reported balance is deflated back to age 62. No tax is applied to benefits or withdrawals in this mode of the engine, so the figures are pre-tax. Returns follow the JPMorgan LTCMA 2026 capital-market assumptions the site's planner uses, sampled with quasi-Monte Carlo, 10,000 paths per arm, identical draws for every arm so the differences are taken path by path.

Related research

Changelog

• v2026.1 (2026-09-07) — initial release. Nine claiming combinations (62 / 67 / 70 for each spouse) for two benefit personas, with and without the higher earner dying at 80; 10,000 paired paths per arm; per-path paired statistics at 95 and by year; deterministic lifetime-benefit schedules.

Last updated 2026-09-07. Dataset license: CC-BY-4.0. QuantCalc is an independent retirement-planning research project. The JPMorgan LTCMA 2026 name identifies the published capital-market assumptions the engine uses; QuantCalc is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by that firm, and all trademarks belong to their respective owners. Educational research, not financial, tax, or legal advice.

@misc{quantcalc2026shouldthelowerearnerclaimsocialsecuritye,
  title  = {Should the Lower Earner Claim Social Security Early and the Higher Earner Delay? A Household Monte Carlo (2026)},
  author = {{QuantCalc Research}},
  year   = {2026},
  url    = {https://quantcalc.app/research/household-social-security-claiming-2026/},
  note   = {Accessed <date>}
}